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Abstract—The detection and prevention of cyber-attacks is one 
of the main challenges in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) 
autonomous platooning scenarios. A key tool in this activity is the 
measurement report that is generated by User Equipment (UE), 
containing received signal strength and location information. Such 
data is effective in techniques to detect Rogue Base Stations (RBS) 
or Subscription Permanent Identifier SUPI/5G-GUTI catchers. 
An undetected RBS could result in unwanted consequences such 
as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and subscriber privacy attacks 
on the network and UE. Motivated by this, this paper presents the 
novel simulation of a 5G cellular system to generate a realistic 
dataset of signal strength measurements that can later be used in 
the development of techniques to identify and prevent RBS 
interventions. The results show that the tool can create a large 
dataset of realistic measurement reports which can be used to 
develop and validate RBS detection techniques.  
Keywords—5G, LTE, Rogue Base Station, Cyber Security, 
Vehicle Platooning, Privacy, Radio Access Network.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The fifth generation of cellular telecommunications 
networks (5G) brings a significant increase in bandwidth and 
reduction of latency compared to previous standards [1]. The 
Next Generation Mobile Network (NGMN) Alliance defines 
5G as an End-to-End (E2E) ecosystem supporting a movable 
connected society [2]. Nevertheless, 5G is not just a next step 
evolution from Long Term Evolution (LTE), which is currently 
the most widely adopted cellular communication standard but 
represents a paradigm shift [3]. Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) 
services, one of the core applications enabled by 5G 
communication systems, enable data exchange between 
vehicles and other nodes. A remote V2X application server 
(AS) centralizes control and distribution of road and traffic 
information[4].  5G could accelerate the adoption of a range of 
vertical markets, heterogeneous services, and use cases with 
their cybersecurity requirements (in wireless communication). 
It needs to support multiple access networks comprising 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications Service (UMTS), and Long-Term 
Evolution (LTE). As a result, 5G implementations will be likely 
to inherit the security challenges of those access networks. The 
essential vulnerabilities and attacks on access networks are 
currently a key topic of research [5].  
The many published threats at the 4G RAN layer include 
Rogue Base Stations (RBS) or International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI) catchers to target IMSIs of User Equipment 
(UE) during the initial attachment process to the network, and 
paging threats using the IMSI paging feature. Once a 
subscriber’s IMSI has been stolen, their privacy can be severely 
compromised. A Man in the Middle (MitM) attack is one of the 
most common attacks against a subscriber. In cellular networks, 
MitM uses an RBS, when the Base Station (BS) of a malicious 
third party masquerades as a genuine network’s BS [6]. This 
study focuses on security considerations involving BSs.  
A. Motivation 
There is a significant body of research to develop accurate 
simulation models of 5G radio channels, mainly aimed at 
modeling both amplitude and phase variations across the 
bandwidth of the radio signal. Hence, they determine the 
performance of the signal processing algorithms that help to 
improve the performance of the radio link [7]. Such models are 
typically quite complex and require a high level of expertise to 
use them correctly. To fill such gaps, we propose a simulation 
model that can efficiently produce realistic signal strength 
metrics, using well-known radio propagation models. The 
model can be easily used by computer science researchers to 
quickly generate large datasets to train and test RBS detection 
methods. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there are no 
currently existing simulations of this nature that do not require 
expert radio knowledge. We consider that this solution will be 
beneficial to the wider 5G security research community. 
B. Our Contribution 
The scenario considered in this paper is an RBS attack on a 
platoon of vehicles to take control of the platoon and cause a 
major traffic incident with significant potential danger to life. 
Such an attack could be executed as a MitM attack where the 
RBS mimics a legitimate BS and relays information between 
the platoon leader and the legitimate BS. Then, by modifying 
the content of the control messages, the platoon leader can be 
instructed to make a maneuver that results in a serious incident. 
The work here assumes that it is possible to autonomously 
detect the presence of an RBS using received signal strength 
and the known location of the legitimate BSs and the position 
of the platoon leader. To develop Machine Learning (ML) 
techniques to perform this detection robustly, researchers 
require a method to generate realistic datasets of signals 
strength and associate locations.  Obviously, one could use 
measured data from a UE in a vehicle driving through a 5G 
coverage area. However, it would be difficult to determine 
whether those observed datasets were typical or contained 
anomalous artifacts. To avoid generating abnormal radio data, 
or data that is in some way specific to the set of tests carried 
out, we have developed a simple simulation in MATLAB that 
can generate datasets for a wide range of scenarios in a fraction 
of the time required to acquire large datasets of measured data 
from a UE in a “drive test”.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
II will discuss the related work and then Section III will provide 
the background. Section IV will present the proposed model. 
Section V will provide the results and discussion, while Section 
VI will conclude the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In recent years, the latest survey of the current technologies 
and open communication challenges focused on the 5G data 
transferring between BSs and V2X and their detection 
techniques [8]. The techniques of RBS detection can be 
summarized in three categories. The first involves the 
application of RBS detection methods from the previous 
generation of communications. The authors in [9] introduced an 
RBS detection method to avoid violations of received signal 
strength reports consistency in WiMax/802.16 wireless access 
networks. Their technique was not particularly robust for LTE 
and 5G technologies, and it did not support a DoS attack among 
BSs. Interestingly, our approach aims to provide a tool that can 
help to fill this gap. Moreover, in [10], the authors design a 
holistic solution to analyse the BSs and detect a rogue device in 
a network. To do so, they aim to scan mobile devices across the 
system, which includes predetermined criteria, executed by a 
processor. The idea is promising; however, they did not take 
account of various real-time interferences in the dedicated 
resources in the 5G network. In [11] the authors utilise a 
machine learning strategy to identify an RBS in the mobile 
network based on the key BS parameters and tested it on 
GSM/LTE features. The work suffers from a lack of deep 
appliance in 5G nodes considering the limited time and did not 
consider a platooning platform for IoT located in a 5G network, 
whilst our method will consider them. The authors in [12] 
designed and implemented a large-scale RBS detection and 
localisation system to detect and quarantine numerous spam 
and fraud SMS messages among UEs while having low 
resource requirements on end-user devices. The work is 
promising and reliable however, a practical implementation 
was not tested and did not check received signals against 
previously known information about the BS. 
The second category of the research papers focuses on 
location-based methods which analyse the signals received 
from the BSs and then compare this with the known coverage 
pattern to identify an RBS in the network. For example, the 
authors in [13] designed two suspicious synchronization signal 
strength checking region criteria. Their method utilises shadow 
fading and small-scale fading effects to understand the cheating 
rates of the signals and locate the RBSs and claims that they 
could cover spoofing attacks in the LTE system. Also, the work 
presented in [14] monitors the imperfections of the transmitter 
on each BS using time-efficient symbol-based statistical RF 
fingerprinting techniques to understand the noise processes in 
the network to identify an RBS. Such works are 
computationally complicated when they are applied to higher 
modulation schemes under actual propagation conditions. 
The third category of solutions considers some encryption 
strategies to preserve the privacy of the transferred data 
between the UE and BS. Such methods build certificates to 
conceal their identity and their detailed information to mitigate 
eavesdropping in an untrusted channel [15][16]. Such methods 
are unable to deal with real-time multi-cast cases in dealing 
with the RBS. The authors in [17] design an efficient tool 
named FBSleuth instantiated in BS devices that can identify 
RBS devices based on minor differences in the emitted signals 
caused by hardware imperfections. They tested their attack 
method by collecting signal traces from 6 real RBSs for 5 
months and validated it under various settings. The work is a 
promising practical solution. However, FBSleuth is not applied 
to a 5G network. 
III. BACKGROUND 
One of the aims of 5G communication networks is to 
provide very high bandwidth and more comprehensive 
coverage by dense deployment of Base Stations (BS) with 
enhanced capacity, significantly ultra-low latency, and better 
Quality of Service (QoS). 
A. Radio Access Networks Threats 
In the security architecture of cellular networks before 5G, 
mutual authentication between UE and core network (Evolved 
Packet Core in LTE), is considered to be one of the principal 
security features to preserve privacy. This uses the 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure to 
generate a ciphering key to protect data encryption and an 
integrity key to derive session keys for signaling integrity. 
Whilst this approach has demonstrated many benefits, it cannot 
completely eradicate the threats posed by RBS attacks [18][11].  
5G exploits two mechanisms to enhance subscribers’ 
privacy. The first mechanism involves the encryption of the 
long-term identifier to prevent IMSI catchers or stingrays [19]. 
Accordingly, 5G uses the Subscription Permanent Identifier 
(SUPI) instead of the IMSI and a Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI), to encrypt the SUPI into the Subscription Concealed 
Identifier (SUCI) [20]. 5G networks also utilise frequent 
changes in subscribers’ short-term identifiers. These two 
techniques already considerably enhance resistance to RBS 
attacks in 5G networks compared to earlier generations. 
B. Rogue Base Station Threat 
The security architecture group in 3GPP (SA3) has 
identified that measurement reports received from mobile 
stations may contain fingerprints (cellprints) of RBSs [21]. SA3 
outlined a framework based on the analysis of measurement 
reports, including information on the characteristics of the radio 
channel, to enable mobile networks to detect such RBSs. The 
framework supplements other techniques introduced in 5G and 
mentioned above to protect users against RBSs [22]. 
IV. PROPOSED MODEL 
As mentioned in the literature, RBS detection is one of the 
major issues that needs to be addressed. In this paper, we 
propose a model where several legitimate BSs provide network 
coverage to an area of a city. The basic idea behind the model 
is to generate measurement reports which can be used to detect 
and identify RBSs in the upcoming cellular technologies.   
In our proposed model, the cellular network’s coverage area 
is divided into many tracking areas, each of which contains 
some BSs (gNodeBs) to serve the tracking area. Fig. 1 
illustrates a scenario where (legitimate) BSs are providing 5G 
coverage to a particular area. The area includes a segment of an 
urban motorway along which platoons of autonomous vehicles 
regularly travel. The platoons are assumed to use some V2V 
communications system between vehicles and one of the 
vehicles is selected as the Platoon Leader which has a 5G 
connection to the 5G system. 
In this example, mobile UEs are vehicles traveling at 
approximately 80 kilometers per hour. The platoon is controlled 
from the V2X application server in the 5G core, and the platoon 
leader exchanges messages with the application server 
periodically in the order of milliseconds [23]. In this model we 
focus on the communication between the platoon and BS based 
on Vehicle-to-Network (V2N) technology.  
Fig. 1. Legitimate base station signal coverage. Xn: the connection between 
two gNB; TAC: Tracking Area Code; CID: Cell Identifier; (Xpos, Ypos): 
location of Platoon’s Leader; 5GUU: 5G uplink and downlink; d: distance 
between base station and Leader; and, gNB: gNodeB. 
Vehicle platooning is one of the key V2X use cases in 5G 
by which a group of autonomous vehicles travel in close 
proximity to one another with the speed of the leader. The 
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication that provides the 
direct link between vehicles is part of Vehicular Ad-hoc 
Network (VANET) communication and is outside of the scope 
of this paper. 
A. Mathematical Model 
In free space (line of sight) communication, the electromagnetic 
wave propagates in a straight line and can be modeled by a 
version of Friis’s free space equation [24]: 
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where Pr is the power (Watts) received by the UE, Pt is the 
power (Watts) fed into the BS antenna and Gt is the gain which 
is a function of the azimuth angle ∅t and elevation angle θt. Gr 
is the gain of the receive antenna which varies with ∅r and θr. 
The variable d is the distance in meters between the transmitting 
antenna of the BS and the receiving antenna of the platoon 
leader, while λ is the wavelength (in meters) of the transmitted 
signal, given by: 
                                                    𝜆 =
𝑐
𝑓
                                           (2) 
where c is the speed of light equal to 3×108 m/s. Substituting 
equation (2) in (1) results in: 
                       𝑃௥ୀ𝑃௧𝐺௧(𝜃௧ , ∅௧)𝐺௥(𝜃௥ , ∅௥) ൬
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                  (3) 
In our simulation, we calculate the location of the mobile 
stations every second and use that information to calculate the 
received power signal of each BS. From the geometry shown in 
Fig. 1 the distance between the BS and the vehicle is based on 
a triangular equation as follows: 
                    𝑑 = ට(𝑉 ∗ 𝑇 − 𝑋஻ௌ೔)
ଶ + (𝑌஻ௌ೔ − 𝑌௣௢௦)
ଶ               (4) 
where V is the speed of the platoon (m/s), T is the simulation 
clock time in seconds and (XBSi, YBSi) is the location of the BS୧, 
while (Xpos, Ypos) is the position of the car. By substituting 
equation (4) into (3) we obtain the following equation: 
            𝑃௥ =
𝑃௧𝐺௧(𝜃௧ , ∅௧)𝐺௥(𝜃௥ , ∅௥)
(𝑉 ∗ 𝑇 − 𝑋஻ௌ೔)
ଶ + ൫𝑋𝑌஻ௌ೔ − 𝑌௣௢௦൯
ଶ (
𝑐
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)ଶ       (5) 
This calculation of the expected received power does not 
capture the variation in the path loss between the BS and the 
UE. The radio path will experience variations due to the 
presence of buildings or vehicles that can obstruct the line of 
sight path or highly variable reflective paths causing 
constructive or destructive interference at the receiver. Since 
the scenario here is a fast-moving vehicle, one would expect 
that the received power at the UE would vary significantly 
about this mean value.  Based on a standard statistical model of 
radio propagation [25], we apply the variation and then convert 
the signal strength to dBm by the following equation: 
(XBS1,YBS1) (XBS3,YBS3) 
(XBSi,YBSi) 
 (TACi ,CID1) 
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                      𝑅𝑥𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 10𝑙𝑜𝑔ଵ଴(𝑃௥ . 𝑥(𝑡)) +30                       (6) 
where x(t) is a time-varying randomized variable that is 
bounded between zero and two [13]. Equation (6) can, 
therefore, be used to calculate the received power signal from 
each BS as the platoon moves along the roadway.  
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
In this section, we will provide an overview of the results 
that we generated through simulation to validate our model. The 
simulation is carried out in MATLAB that is installed on a 
quad-core Dell machine equipped with 3.06 GHz Intel Xeon 
CPU and 12 GB of RAM. The entire simulation is based on the 
parameters listed in Table 1.  
A detailed explanation of the figures generated from 
different scenarios through simulation is given in the following 
sub-sections. With regard to the accuracy of this simulation 
model, we assumed that the propagation is done while the 
mobile UE is within the antenna’s coverage area, i.e. the 
platoon leader is within the range of BSs. 
A. Legitimate Base Station Scenario and Results  
The simulator is configured to emulate a 5G urban 
motorway scenario with three BSs with physical locations, as 
shown in Fig. 2. The transmission frequency used here is 
3.8GHz, part of the 5G New Radio spectrum. 
When the UE (in this example, the lead vehicle of a platoon) 
is within the range of the BSs, the received signal strength or 
RSRP (Reference Signal Received Power) is calculated once 
per second, producing the graph of received signal strength 
values shown in Fig. 3. Typically, the handover decision in 5G 
RAN  is based on the data contained in the measurement report 
[26]. The UE measures the signal power of the surrounding 
cells based on the Synchronization Signal Block (SSB), which 
carries the Master Information Block (MIB) and 
synchronization signal without safety protection [27]. 
Moreover, as can be seen in Fig. 4, the UE handover from one 
BS to another occurs when the signal strength from the 2nd BS 
exceeds a specified threshold. In this simulation, the threshold 
difference to hand over is 7dB. 
B. Attack Model Scenario and Results  
In this section, we outline a potential RBS attack scenario. 
An attacker sets up an RBS in the vicinity of the road segment, 
indicated by the red dot in Fig. 2. 
TABLE I.  SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR THE ATTACK MODEL 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
5G New Radio Frequency 3.8 GHz Number of BS 3 
Platoon Speed 80 Km/h Road Width 300 m 
RBS TX Power 0.5 (Watt) Road Length 23000 m 
BS TX Power 1 (Watt) BS Gain 1 (dBm) 
Number of RBS 1 RBS Gain 15 (dBm) 
Fig. 2. The simulation geography, motorway width=300 metres, motorway 
length= 23000 metres 
 
Fig. 3. Received signal strength for a mobile UE from several standalone 
legitimate base stations 
 
This location enables the RBS to listen on the same channel 
as the legitimate BS for a sufficiently long time for it to be able 
to gather enough information to be able to mimic the legitimate 
BS. Then, when it detects the presence of a large platoon of 
autonomous vehicles, it begins to transmit using either a higher 
power transmission or a directional antenna. Thus, the platoon 
will see a substantially higher power signal from the rogue than 
it does from the legitimate BS. As a consequence of the 
handover protocol, the RBS requires the received power at the 
platoon to be more than 7 dB higher than the legitimate BS for 
the UE to switch to the RBS automatically. Once this threshold 
is reached, the handover takes place, and the rogue can now 
send commands to the platoon to make a sudden turn and cause 
a major road traffic incident. Fig. 5 illustrates an RBS with 2 
beams – normally, they would use only one, but there are two 
included in our simulation to show how the direction in which 
the antenna is pointing could significantly impact the amount 
of road that is covered. 
 
Fig. 4. Received signal strength  for a mobile UE after the handover protocol 
Fig. 5.  RBS attack scenario, (XBS, YBS): location of the base station; TA, TB: 
edges of narrow beams; BWθ: beam width angles; V2V: Vehicle-to-Vehicle 
communications; TAC: Tracking Area Code; and, CID: Cell Identifier. 
 
Implementing an RBS with high transmitting power is 
unlikely for adversaries because it is quite expensive and 
requires the installation of very large equipment. Typically, they 
set up an RBS consisting of a wireless transceiver, a laptop, and 
a cell phone, allowing passive and active attacks against UE 
subscribers over RANs. The transceiver broadcasts radio signals 
to impersonate genuine BSs. 
In this study, an RBS has been simulated with less power but 
with an antenna with a narrow beam that covers part of the 
motorway with higher gain to deceive the user equipment and 
penetrate the network. Since the antenna concentrates power, it 
strengthens the transmission power in a single direction, while 
decreasing the power in other directions. Reducing the 
horizontal beam width, for example, strengthens the power in a 
narrower directional beam. The gain of an antenna is the ratio of 
the power flux density in a given direction to the power flux 
density that would be present from an isotropic radiator (i.e., an 
antenna that radiates equally in all directions). Therefore, the 
gain of the antenna is inversely proportional to the beam width 
[24][28]: 
                            𝐺(𝑑𝐵) = 10𝐿𝑜𝑔 ൤
𝐴𝑃𝐶
𝐵𝑊ఏ𝐵𝑊Ф
൨                        (7) 
In our model, the antenna pattern has been assumed as a 
rectangular area and the value APC (defined as the Antenna 
Pattern Constant) yields a constant of 41,253 when the beam 
width angles are expressed in degrees [12]. 
Within the simulation, it is assumed that the horizontal and 
vertical beam widths are equal. Thus, equation (7) is rearranged 
so that the beam width of the antenna is calculated from its 
specified gain. This is used with the location of the RBS to 
calculate when the UE is within the coverage of the RBS. This 
is then used to calculate the times when the UE is within the 
coverage of the RBS’s narrow beams: TA and TB are these times 
indicated in Fig. 5. As can be seen in Fig. 6, the RBS produces 
a higher receive signal strength which can deceive the UE. As 
expected, there are two zones where the power from the RBS is 
higher since we are using two beams. The first beam is angled 
at 60 degrees to the roadway and hence we see a larger received 
power, but for a shorter duration, compared to the second beam 
which is angled at 30 degrees to the roadway. 
Consequently, as shown in Fig. 7, the RBS masquerades as 
the second legitimate BS and forges its system information. As 
a result, the victim UE may camp to the RBS. In this scenario, 
the serving BS receives the UE measurement report which 
involves measurements from the RBS. The serving BS would 
assume that the information in the UE measurement report 
belongs to BS2 so may decide to handover the UE to the RBS 
instead of BS2. 
As a consequence, the intended handover from BS1 to BS2 
will fail. Instead, BS1 will hand-over the UE to the RBS which 
succeeds in gaining control of the communication link to the 
UE. Although the UE may only be captured for a few tens of 
seconds in such a scenario, this is sufficient for information to 
be stolen or for a traffic collision to be caused. 
 
Fig. 6. Received signal strength for a mobile UE from a Rogue Base Station 
with two beams 
(XBS1,YBS1) (XBS2,Y BS2) 
(Xpos, Ypos) Platooning TB TA 
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Fig. 7. Received signal strength for a mobile UE after the handover protocol 
 in the attack model 
 
 Since the simulator described here is relatively simple and 
generates receive signal level reports calculated from a defined 
geographical arrangement of base stations and roadways, the 
essential parameters of a UE’s measurement reports can be 
generated and used to devise new ways to prevent such RBS 
attacks. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
RBS attacks are a serious threat to cellular networks and 
users. The anticipated use of 5G systems to control critical 
systems such as vehicular platoons opens the possibility of 
catastrophic consequences. This paper describes the simulation 
of a platoon moving through a radio coverage area and 
calculating received signal strength. We build a tool generating 
a realistic dataset of radio information and signal strength 
measurements in an RBS scenario. The dataset is generated 
using well-known radio propagation models that can be easily 
used and do not attempt to be a highly accurate simulation of 
radio propagation. In summary, it is worthy to note that we can 
generate a dataset of 20 minute drive time in a 15 seconds 
simulation. This approach enables the researchers to create a 
range of geographical and radio scenarios and generate 
measurement report data in the absence of any anomalous radio 
propagation situations. 
 Since the broadcast channels of BSs in 5G and preceding 
systems must contain uncyphered information so that UEs can 
identify each BS and decide which one to attach to, it will 
always be possible for RBS attacks to be launched. However, 
by using the reported information in the measurement reports, 
the network can look for anomalous behavior to indicate that an 
RBS is attempting to capture a UE. Future work will use this 
simulator in a vehicular platooning scenario to design machine 
learning methods to detect RBS attacks and protect against 
them.  
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